Conspiracy is factual issue that can be proved or disproved at trial: Delhi HC grants bail to IAS officer Anil Tuteja kingpin of illegal liquor syndicate in Chattisgarh [Read Order]

The Delhi High Court granted bail to IAS officer Anil Tuteja, the alleged kingpin of an illegal liquor syndicate in Chattisgarh, emphasized that conspiracy was a factual issue that can be proved or disproved during the trial. A complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C was made by Income Tax Office through Mr. Seuj Kumar Saikia, DDIT, Inv. Unit-1(4), New Delhi, alleging commission of offense punishable u/s 276C(1)/277/278 read with Section 278B/278E of The Income Tax Act, 1961 and section 120B/191/199/200/204 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short IPC). Since, the present complaint was filed by a public servant acting in discharge of his official duties and in course of his employment, so the formal examination of the AR of complainant was dispensed with, in terms of proviso (a) of Section 200 Cr.P.C The grave men of accusation against accused persons is that Anil Tuteja (accused No. 1), a promote IAS officer in the state of Chattisgarh is engaged in movement of unaccounted cash through different channels with regard to sectors such as agriculture, mining, liquor trade and licensing in the state of Chhattisgarh. His son Yash Tuteja (accused no. 2) and Saumya Chaurasia (accused no. 3) Deputy Secretary of Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh are his accomplices who are actively engaged and involved in aforementioned illegal operations. S.V. Raju, Additional Solicitor General of India appeared on behalf of the petitioner and submitted that the ACMM, by the impugned order dated 06.04.2023, took cognizance of only half or part of the offenses and returned the complaint qua the offenses under Section 276C(1)/278 read with Section 278B/278E of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and Sections 120B/199/200/204 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 committed by the accused persons on the ground that the Courts in Delhi lacked territorial jurisdiction over such offenses, which was impermissible in law. ASG submitted that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offense did not necessarily have territorial jurisdiction to try the case, as his power to take cognizance of the offense was not impaired by territorial jurisdiction. He further submitted that even the provisions of Section 179 Cr.P.C. did not restrict the powers of any court to take cognizance of the offense. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal reported as 1999 8 SCC 686, especially to Para Nos. 11 and 13, to submit that the Court could not be impaired by territorial jurisdiction during the pre-cognizance stage Mr. Raju submitted that the acts of criminal conspiracy and willful evasion of tax committed by the accused respondents extended to the local area of the NCT of Delhi by way of statements given in concert by the Respondent Nos. 1, 2, and 3 in order to evade and deflect the Tax Authorities and thereby, gave the Courts Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signing Date: 08.01.2024 16:09:46 in Delhi the territorial jurisdiction over the offenses alleged in the complaint of the petitioner. Mr. Raju drew support from the judgment in Prabhu Chawla Vs. State of Rajasthan & Another reported in (2016) 16 SCC 30 wherein the Supreme Court made it clear that since Section 397 Cr.P.C. is attracted against all orders other than interlocutory, a contrary view would limit the availability of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. only to petty interlocutory orders, which is wholly unwarranted. On this basis, learned ASG submitted that the present petition filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is maintainable regardless of the availability of remedy under Section 397 Cr.P.C. Tyagi, counsel appearing for respondent No. 5 submitted that the allegations presented before this Court by the petitioner regarding respondent No. 5 abetting in signing false statements by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were never part of the complaint. He emphasized that the petitioner cannot go beyond what is alleged in the complaint. P. Roychaudhuri argued that there is nothing against respondent No. 8 except some alleged WhatsApp chats exchanged between respondent No. 8 and respondents Nos. 1 to 3. He further argued that respondent No. 8 has not been served by the Income Tax Office, and till date, there are no assessment proceedings against respondent No. 8. Respondent No. 8 was never summoned in Delhi or Chhattisgarh. P. Roychaudhuri highlighted the Memo of Parties, asserting that the complaint originated from the Income Tax Office through the Deputy Director of Income Tax (DDIT), with prior approval from the competent authority. He emphasized that the affidavit was submitted by the Additional Director of Income Tax (Investigation) instead of DDIT, who holds the authority. Referring to the initial Stay Application CRL.M.A. 10323/2023, he contended that the petitioner sought to stay a portion of the order dated 06.04.2023. Roychaudhuri further argued that filing another identical Stay Application CRL.M.A. 19314/2023 is impermissible since notice has already been issued in CRL.M.A. 10323/2023. He maintained that the Stay Application lacks support for the three essential conditions - a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and demonstration of irreparable loss or injury to the petitioner. The single member bench comprising Justice Tushar Rao Gedela concluded that offences under Section 276C(1)/278 read with Section 278B/278E of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and Sections 120B/199/200/204 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is restrained till further orders. The court observed that the aforesaid observations are purely prima facie in nature and shall not tantamount to any expression on the merits of the matter, at this stage. The applications stand disposed of in above terms. Support our journalism by subscribing to Taxscan premium. Follow us on Telegram for quick updates