Administrative Lapses Held Not ‘Sufficient Cause’: DRAT Dismisses Karur Vysya Bank’s 194‑Day Late Appeal [Read Order]
The order underscores the judiciary’s consistent stance that procedural diligence is essential and that technical excuses cannot override statutory limitation.
![Administrative Lapses Held Not ‘Sufficient Cause’: DRAT Dismisses Karur Vysya Bank’s 194‑Day Late Appeal [Read Order]](https://images.taxscan.in/h-upload/2026/06/20/2140897-drat-dismisses-karur-vysya-banks-delayed-appeal.webp "Administrative Lapses Held Not ‘Sufficient Cause’: DRAT Dismisses Karur Vysya Bank’s 194‑Day Late Appeal [Read Order]")
The Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), Kolkata, has dismissed the bank's appeal against a Debt Recovery Tribunal order, holding that administrative lapses and departmental delays cannot constitute “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The appeal arose from S.A. 355 of 2019, in which the Debt Recovery Tribunal had allowed...
The Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), Kolkata, has dismissed the bank's appeal against a Debt Recovery Tribunal order, holding that administrative lapses and departmental delays cannot constitute “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
The appeal arose from S.A. 355 of 2019, in which the Debt Recovery Tribunal had allowed the securitisation application filed by respondent Tanvi Enterprises. The bank sought to challenge that decision but filed its appeal belatedly, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
The appellant Karur Vysya Bank Limited argued that the delay was unintentional and occurred due to the retirement of the concerned officer on 31 March 2025 and relocation of the Recovery Department, which allegedly disrupted internal communication. The bank claimed it applied for a certified copy of the impugned order only on 28 April 2025, and after obtaining it, sought instructions from higher authorities before filing the appeal on 11 August 2025.
Counsel for the respondent, Tanvi Enterprises contended that these reasons reflected mere administrative lapses and not “sufficient cause” under the statute. The tribunal agreed, observing that the bank “simply slept over the matter” despite its counsel being present when the DRT delivered the judgment.
Justice Srivastava cited the Supreme Court’s rulings in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (LA) [2024 LiveLaw (SC) 288], Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81, and K.B. Lal v. Gyanendra Pratap [2024 SCC OnLine SC 508], reiterating that while courts may adopt a liberal approach, negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides cannot justify condonation of inordinate delay.
The tribunal stated that “State or its instrumentalities stand on the same footing as private litigants” and cannot claim special treatment.
Finding that the bank took over a month even after receiving the certified copy to prepare its draft appeal, the tribunal held that such conduct “could not be accepted as a sufficient ground for condonation.” Consequently, I.A. 529 of 2025 was dismissed, and the appeal was rejected as time‑barred.
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