Supreme Court & High Courts Weekly Round-Up

The Division Bench of Justice Bhargav D. Karia and Justice D.N. Ray of the Gujarat High Court held that once the assessee had duly intimated the change in name and obtained a new PAN, the jurisdiction stood automatically transferred to the new assessing officer. The High Court thus quashed the reopening notice and all consequential proceedings, while noting that any notice issued by the former officer is null and void, and devoid of jurisdiction.The Revenue, being aggrieved by this position, approached the Supreme Court through the present case.A Division Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma first condoned the delay in filing the appeal and then noted that there was no requirement to interfere with the judgment and order of the Gujarat High Court and accordingly dismissed the petition, and interlocutory applications.

The Supreme Court of India dismissed the Revenue’s Special Leave Petition (SLP) against the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s ruling of upholding the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal’s (ITAT) deletion of an addition of ₹3.73 crore made under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose from the ITAT’s findings, concluding that the principle is that the Tribunal is the final fact‑finding authority in income tax matters.

The Court observed that the ITAT had considered all relevant material and passed a reasoned order. Importantly, the Court reiterated that unless perversity in the Tribunal’s findings is demonstrated, no substantial question of law arises.It was observed that an appeal to the High Court from a decision of the Tribunal lies only when a substantial question of law is involved, and where the High Court concludes that a substantial question of law arises from the said order, such question(s) must be formulated. It was also observed that the expression "substantial question of law" is not defined in the Act.The Revenue’s attempt to re‑argue factual issues under the guise of legal questions was impermissible. Aggrieved by this order of the High Court, the revenue filed an appeal before the Supreme Court, which condoned the delay in the SLP filed by the revenue in filing, but declined to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Bench of Justices Pankaj Mithal and S.V.N. Bhatti noted that the High Court had rightly held that no substantial question of law was involved.

The SupremeCourt has rejected the retrospective application of section 433 of the Companies Act and held that the Company Law Board (CLB) cannot borrow such powers from the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under the act.The issue arose from a long-pending transmission of shares in a private company named The Property Company (P) Ltd, which is the appellant in the present case.The appellant had 631 fully paid-up equity shares. Among them, 20 shares were held by Ms Mehroo Mazda, mother of the respondent, Mr Rohinten Daddy Mazda.

t was held that it would not be permissible for one to say that the power to condone delay which has been given to the NCLT beginning from 01.06.2016 must enure to the benefit of an appeal which had become time-barred much before the commencement of the Act, 2013. If such an argument is accepted then it would have the consequence of affecting vested rights. Finally, it was held that the High Court had committed an error in dismissing the statutory appeal filed under Section 10F of the Erstwhile Act and thereby, affirming the order of the CLB condoning the delay of 249 days in filing the appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013.. As a result, the appeal was allowed

In a recent ruling, the Supreme Court held that multiple cheques issued in relation to the same transaction can give rise to separate prosecutions under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The case came from two decisions by the Delhi High Court in petitions filed by MGI Developers and Promoters and its owner Manoj Goyal. They want to cancel multiple complaints about cheque bounce filed by the complainant, Sumit Bansal.

The court pointed out that whether cheques issued as alternative security or in place of each other is disputed fact question which cannot be decided at quashing stage under Section 482 CrPC. It said that by checking these, the High Court entered into fact enquiry which was not allowed at early stage.For the other complaints, the Supreme Court observed that claims about no liability or earlier repayment are defence matters. It explains that once cheque issued and bounces, a legal presumption favours complainant and accused has to prove otherwise in trial. The Supreme Court allowed complainant’s appeal and quashed High Court order quashing firm cheques complaint, restoring it for trial. The appeals by respondents are dismissed.

The Supreme Court held that the ruling in Union of India v. Ashish Agarwal applies only to defective reassessment notices issued under the Income Tax Act, 1961, and does not authorise the reopening of assessments that have already attained finality. The case arose from reassessment proceedings initiated by the Income Tax Department against United Associates and another assessee for the Assessment Year 2016-17. The Department issued notices under Section 148 in June and July 2022, followed by orders under Section 148A(d) seeking to reopen assessments that had already been concluded.

A Bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti observed that the impugned High Court order was based on an earlier Delhi High Court judgment which the Department had accepted and not challenged. The court observed that once the Revenue had chosen not to appeal against that earlier judgment, it could not reopen the same legal issue through a subsequent appeal. In view of the unexplained delay and the merits of the case, the Supreme Court dismissed the Revenue’s appeal and upheld the Delhi High Court’s order.

The Court recorded that all the petitions were covered by its earlier decision in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, and accordingly quashed and set aside the reassessment orders and notices, while keeping all other rights and contentions of the parties open. Aggrieved by the High Court’s ruling, the Revenue approached the Supreme Court by filing a SLP.The Supreme Court condoned the delay in filing the SLP and thereafter held that the matter is squarely covered by its judgment in Union of India & Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal (supra). In view of this binding precedent, the Court disposed of the Revenue’s petitions, clarifying that the assessee shall be governed by the reasons discussed in Rajeev Bansal (supra), and the assessing officers are required to dispose of objections in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court.Further, the assessee, if aggrieved thereafter, would be at liberty to pursue remedies available under law, except on issues already concluded by the judgment.Accordingly, the Bombay High Court’s order quashing the reassessment notices continues to hold the field.

The Supreme Court has dismissed the Revenue’s Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenging the Bombay High Court’s order quashing reassessment proceedings for Assessment Year (A.Y.) 2017-18 on the ground of invalid sanction under Section 151 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The case pertains to A.Y. 2017-18, wherein reassessment proceedings were initiated against the assessee, Rajendra Bothmal Singhvi. The assessee challenged the validity of the notice and subsequent proceedings before the Bombay High Court. One of the principal grounds raised was that the sanction for issuance of the reassessment notice had been obtained under an incorrect provision of Section151 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The High Court further clarified that any assessment order passed subsequently, relying on such invalid sanction, would also stand vitiated. Accordingly, all notices and orders impugned in the writ petition, along with all consequential proceedings, were quashed and set aside. The writ petition was disposed of, while reserving liberty to the parties to raise other grounds in appropriate proceedings.Aggrieved by the High Court’s decision, the Revenue filed a SLP before the Supreme Court. After condoning the delay, the Supreme Court noted that the issue raised was squarely covered by its judgment in Union of India & Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal (2024).In view of the settled legal position, the Supreme Court disposed of the Revenue’s petition. The Court clarified that the assessee would be governed by the reasons discussed in Rajeev Bansal, and that the assessing officers would dispose of objections in accordance with the law laid down therein.

The Supreme Court ruled that prosecution for fraud under the Companies Act can be initiated only by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) or by an officer authorised, not through a private criminal complaint.The case comes from the dispute over management of Shreemukh Namitha Homes Private Limited, a real estate company started in 2015. The complainant and his wife was original promoters and majority shareholders. The appellants was appointed as directors between 2015 and 2016. Later disputes happen about control of company.

The court observed that “Anything that cannot be done directly, also cannot be done indirectly.” The court further observed that Sections 448 and 447 are inextricably linked and cannot be read in isolation. It observed that “The offence under Section 448 of the Companies Act is an ‘offence covered under Section 447’ as mentioned in Section 212(6) of the Companies Act.” The court explained that where allegations of fraud in the affairs of a company are made, the complainant must follow the procedure laid down under the Companies Act, including approaching the Registrar of Companies and where necessary, the SFIO. It pointed out that a private complaint is not the legally prescribed route for prosecuting fraud under the Companies Act. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals. It quashed the criminal proceedings insofar as they related to offences under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act.

In a very important ruling, the Supreme Court held that Tiger Global’s Mauritius-based investment entities are not entitled to claim DTAA protection for capital gains arising from the sale of Flipkart shares. Justice R. Mahadevan and J.B. Pardiwala observed that the “In the case at hand, there is clear and convincing prima facie evidence to demonstrate that the arrangement was designed with the sole intent of evading tax, and the assessees have failed to furnish sufficient material to rebut this presumption.”

The court noted that the transfer of investment commenced only on 09.05.2018. As per the Share Purchase Agreement, the sale of shares held by the assessees was approved by the Board in its meeting held on 04.05.2018. The subject appears to have arisen for discussion in the meeting held on 12.06.2018. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed. The high court order was set aside.

Justice Neena Bansal Krishna observed that Section 91 CrPC empowers the court to summon documents only if they are necessary or desirable for a just decision of the case. The court observed that the petitioner had admitted that copies of the DRT records and complaints were already supplied to him as un-relied documents. The court explained that if the petitioner required original documents for exhibition, he was free to approach the DRT directly, and there was no requirement for the trial court to summon those records.The court held that there was no violation of the petitioner’s right to a fair trial and no infirmity in the trial court’s order dismissing the applications under Section 91 CrPC. The petition was dismissed.

The Delhi High Court recently ruled that the issuance of summons by an officer of the Revenue under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) cannot be construed as the initiation of proceedings against the subject individual. The decision was given by the Court in a writ petition filed by the petitioners, Md. Aniqul Islam and Akhtar Hussain who were registered dealers and suppliers engaged in the bidi business.

The High Court accordingly held that “issuance of summons under Section 70 CGST Act cannot be considered to be initiation of proceedings against the Petitioners.” The Court further clarified that in cases where there is a possibility of arrest, Section 69 of the CGST Act contains inherent safeguards requiring the Commissioner to have "reasons to believe that a person has committed an offence under Section132 of the CGST, it further provides that the officer authorized to arrest the person shall inform such person the ground of arrest.The petition was accordingly dismissed by the High Court for being premature, however, with liberty to the petitioners to approach the appropriate forum at a later stage if required.

In a recent decision, the Delhi High Court ruled that a minor mistake in counting seized currency notes cannot be a ground to doubt the recovery of counterfeit money. The Court upheld the conviction of the accused under Section 489C of the Indian Penal Code. This matter related to the recovery of fake Indian currency notes at IGI Airport, New Delhi.

The Bench comprising Justice Neena Bansal Krishna observed that the sealed packets of seized currency remained intact at all stages and there was no sign of tampering. The court explained that small counting or serial number mistakes cannot cancel out the recovery of a large amount of fake currency when expert evidence clearly showed that the notes were counterfeit.The court also observed that the accused’s statement under Section 108 of theCustoms Act was admissible in evidence and was never withdrawn. It was voluntary and supported by other facts on record.The court agreed that there was no proof that the accused was involved in trading or circulating fake currency under Section 489B IPC. However, it pointed out that possession of counterfeit currency under Section 489C IPC was clearly proved. The court partly set aside the acquittal and upheld the conviction of the accused under Section 489C IPC. The case was listed separately for hearing on the question of sentence, and the appeal was disposed of.

The Punjab & Haryana High Court refused to grant bail to an accused holding that the alleged ₹55 crore service tax evasion forms a serious economic offence affecting the economy of the country. DGGI (Directorate General of GST Intelligence) conducted investigation in the company of Radhey Shyam, the petitioner of this case. The petitioner, with another, faced prosecution under Central Excise Act, 1944 and the Finance Act, 1994, read with Section174 of the CGST Act.

The high court rejected the submissions of the petitioner and rejected the bail. It noted that the petitioners were involved in 49 FIRs which have been registered against them in different parts of the country for allegedly defrauding public persons. ‘The act of evasion of tax about Rs. 55 crores amounts to commission of a serious economic offence constituting fraud on the economy of the country itself. These offences are to be considered as a class apart’ observed the court. Justice Manisha Batra, considering the gravity of allegations, said that the act of delaying the joining of proceedings in the matter since the year 2018. Therefore, the court said that the bail should not be granted to the petitioner.

Upcoming Marriage in Family: Delhi HC allows 6.862 kg Seized Gold Jewellery release after Family agrees to Deposit ₹2.5 Cr Advance Tax KOSHALIYA DEVI RASTOGI vs ASSISTANT/ DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OFINCOME TAX CITATION : 2026 TAXSCAN (HC) 161

In a recent ruling, the Delhi High Court allowed the release of about 6.862 kg of seized gold jewellery and bullion along with cash and foreign currency of around Rs. 40 lakh, after members of a family agreed to deposit Rs. 2.5 crore as advance or self-assessment tax and considering the upcoming wedding in the family. The case arose from a batch of writ petitions filed by Koshalia Devi Rastogi and her family members, who are regular income tax assessees. The petitions challenged the continued retention of gold jewellery, bullion, and cash seized by the Income Tax Department during a search conducted at their premises between 17 December 2024 and 20 December 2024.

The Division Bench comprising Justice Dinesh Mehta and Justice Vinod Kumar observed that some of the petitioners were senior citizens above eighty years of age and others were young family members below thirty years of age. Taking into account these circumstances and the consent arrived at between the parties, the court accepted the arrangement placed before it. The court directed Sonali Rastogi and Manit Rastogi to deposit Rs. 1.25 crore each as advance or self-assessment tax on or before 15 January 2026. The court further directed that after the amount was deposited and proof was produced before the assessing officer, the entire seized gold jewellery and bullion weighing about 6.862 kg along with the seized cash and foreign currency should be released within seven days. The writ petitions were disposed of.

GST ITC Reversal on Limitation Unsustainable After Retrospective Insertion of S.16(5) of CGST Act: Madras HC Rules in Favour of Jewellery SELVA VILAS JEWELLERY vs The Superintendent of GST and CentralExcise CITATION : 2026 TAXSCAN (HC) 163

The Madras High Court has ruled that Goods and Services Tax (GST) Input Tax Credit (ITC) reversal on the ground of limitation is not sustainable after the retrospective application of the inserted section 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act (CGST). The court quashed an assessment order issued under Section 73 of the Tamil Nadu GST Act, 2017, which had reversed the ITC claimed by a registered dealer on limitation grounds.

The Council’s recommendation was given legislative effect through the Finance Act (No.2) of 2024, which inserted Section 16(5) with retrospective operation from 1 July 2017. Notifications and circulars issued by the CBICsubsequently clarified that ITC claims for those years could be availed in returns filed up to 30 November 2021. Applying this precedent, Justice Krishnan Ramasamy held that the impugned order dated 2 April 2024 was liable to be quashed insofar as it denied ITC on limitation grounds. The Court emphasized that the retrospective amendment overrides Section 16(4) and entitles taxpayers to ITC claims for the specified years, provided returns were filed by 30 November 2021. Consequently, the Department’s Section 16(4) to deny ITC was unsustainable, and the assessment order could not stand. The Court granted relief by quashing the assessment order to the extent it was based on limitation.

GST Officer Rejected Jindal Steel’s Rectification Plea on GST Shortfall between GSTR-3B & E-Way Bill Arbitrarily: Orissa HC Directs Proper Hearing Jindal Steel Limited vs Commissioner Commercial Taxes and Goodsand Service Tax CITATION : 2026 TAXSCAN (HC) 164

The Orissa High Court recently rebuked the mechanical rejection by the Goods and Services Tax (GST) authorities against a rectification application filed by Jindal Steel regarding an apparent shortfall in tax amount between GSTR-3B and the E-wayBill on the portal. Jindal Steel is a prominent entity in the Indian iron and non-alloy steel industry, and has filed its annual returns in Form GSTR-9 and GSTR-9C for Financial Year 2020-21.

The Court noted that the authority had failed to consider the records and documents produced by the petitioner to support the reconciliation of figures between GSTR-3B and the E-Way Bill data. Under such circumstances, the High Court remanded the case to the state tax officer with the direction that the rectification application be disposed of on proper grounds after considering the supporting documents/records available on the portal as was said to have been uploaded by the petitioner. The order was to be delivered within fifteen working days and pass an appropriate reasoned order rectifying the initial ex-parte Order dated 06.01.2025, if need be, in terms of Section 161 of the GST Act.

GST Notifications Extending Limitation u/s 168A Stand Vitiated and Illegal: Madras HC Sets Aside Assessment Order Abdul Kader M vs The State Tax Officer Uthamapalayam AssessmentCircle Commercial Taxes Buildings CITATION: 2026 TAXSCAN (HC) 165

In a recent judgment, the Madras High Court (Madurai Bench) held that GST notifications that extend the limitation under Section 168A of the CentralGoods and Services (CGST) Act are invalid and illegal, and it quashed an assessment order passed based on those notifications.

Justice Krishnan Ramasamy observes that validity of these notifications no longer open to question, as court already said Notification Nos. 09/2023 and 56/2023 are invalid and illegal. The court explained these notifications reduce the time limit against the Supreme Court’s orders under Article 142 and based on wrong understanding of law. At the same time, the court observed that starting proceedings under Section 168A can be treated as valid because of the Supreme Court’s extension during the pandemic. The court pointed out that the assessment order of 30 July 2024 was passed without giving the petitioner personal hearing, which was a clear violation of natural justice. Because of these, the High Court quashed the assessment order and sent back the matter to assessing officer for fresh look. The writ petition was disposed of without any order on costs.

Telangana HC strikes down GST Rule 39(1)(a), Holds Mandatory Same-Month ITC Distribution Ultra Vires BirlaNu Ltd vs Union of India and 3 others CITATION : 2026 TAXSCAN (HC) 166

In a recent ruling, the Telangana High Court held that GST Rule 39(1)(a), which requires an Input Service Distributor to distribute Input Tax Credit in the same month in which it becomes available, is ultra vires Section 20 of the CGST Act.The court struck down the rule to that extent and quashed the GST audit report and penalty proceedings initiated against BirlaNu Ltd.

The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Aparesh Kumar Singh and Justice G.M. Mohiuddin observed that Section 20 of the CGST Act, as it stood before 1 April 2025, did not prescribe any time limit for distribution of Input Tax Credit.The court observed that Rule 39(1)(a), by introducing a mandatory time limit, went beyond the scope of the parent statute. The court also observed that delegated legislation cannot take away a vested statutory right and that the audit proceedings were conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. In view of these findings, the High Court struck down Rule 39(1)(a) to the extent it mandates same-month distribution of Input Tax Credit and quashed the audit report, show cause notice, and penalty proceedings. The writ petition was allowed with no order as to costs.

“Relevant Period” to be Applied Consistently while computing GST ITC, Turnover and Adjusted Turnover for Refund: Madras HC M/s.Sea 6 Energy Private Limited vs Assistant Commissioner ofCentral Taxes CITATION : 2026 TAXSCAN (HC) 167

The Madras High Court recently clarified the meaning of “relevant period” for the refund formula under Rule 89(4) of the Central Goods and Service Tax Rules, 2017, holding that the relevant period must be applied consistently to all components for computation, including net input tax credit (ITC), Turnover, and Adjusted Total Turnover.

Justice Swaminathan noted that the petitioner wanted to construe the expression “relevant period” as March as far as the turn over is concerned. However, when it came to net ITC, the petitioner wanted the court to hold that the petitioner is entitled to full ITC accumulated around the year but availed in March.Considering that the petitioner had been labouring under a misconception, the petitioner was permitted by the Court to make a fresh application to the respondents, wherein the formula laid down would be applied to compute the ITC refund claims.

Limitation Plea Raised for First Time at Hearing Without Supporting Facts: Madras HC Upholds Tribunal’s RejectionModern Engineering & Plastics Pvt Ltd. vs Customs, ExciseAnd Service Tax Appellate Tribunal CITATION : 2026 TAXSCAN (HC) 168

The Madras High Court has upheld the Customs and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal’s (CESTAT) rejection of a limitation plea that was raised for the first time before it, under Section 11Aof the Central Excise Act, without supporting facts.

The Division Bench of Dr. Justice Anita Sumanth and Justice P. Dhanabal held that the issue of limitation here was a mixed question of law and fact, so in the absence of necessary factual material, the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the plea. It concluded that the substantial questions of law must be answered in favour of the Department and against the assessee. Accordingly, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal was dismissed, with no order as to costs.

Failure to Apply Clause 3(d) of RBI's Master Circular: Calcutta HC Sets Aside Wilful Defaulter Tag by SBI on Non‑Executive Director Shrivardhan Goenka vs State bank of India and Others CITATION : 2026 TAXSCAN (HC) 169

The Calcutta High Court sets aside the wilful defaulter tag on a non-executive director of a company, holding that there was a failure on the part of the Review Committee (RC) to apply Clause 3(d) of the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) Master Circular.

The Court set aside the RC’s order dated April 18, 2023, and consequently nullified the IC’s declaration, since the latter attains finality only upon RC affirmation. SBI was directed to immediately remove Goenka’s name from the CentralInformation Companies (CIC) list of wilful defaulters and reverse any consequential steps within one month.

The Madras High Court, in a case where the import was declared as grey fabric but found to be corduroy, upheld the confiscation and penalties imposed on the parties under the Customs Act by the authorities, but relieved a non-importing entity from the same. The case arose from the import of a consignment declared as Cotton Griege (Grey) fabric. The appellant claimed the benefit of the Duty Free Replenishment Certificate (DFRC licence)

The Division Bench of Dr. Justice AnitaSumanth and Justice P. Dhanabal held that the misdeclaration was clearly established, which clearly justifies the confiscation and penalty. Thus, the appeal filed by Vikram Traders were dismissed The appeal filed by Shrikrishna Spinning and Weaving Mills was allowed. The court observed that the entity had no role in the subject import and could not be penalised. The penalty imposed on them was set aside.

The Bench of Justice Milind N Jadhav observed that contempt jurisdiction by nature is extraordinary, penal and coercive, and it has to be traceable to statute or constitution. It was observed that Section 425, Companies Act, 2013 Confers contempt powers on NCLT/NCLAT equivalent to High Courts. Thus it applies to all matters before them and not only company matters. It was also noted that NCLT derives its existence from companies act, but it is a functioning authority under the IBC. Both statutes are interconnected. The court depende don (Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. v. State of Assam, 1989 where it was held that statutory provisions must be interpreted to give meaningful effect and Dr Subramanian Swamy v. Arun Shourie, 2014 where it was held that NCLT qualifies as a “court” under the Contempt of Courts Act.

The Madurai bench of Madras High Court said that proceedings against short payment of tax or tax not paid on the intention of fraud shall be initiated under Section 74A from Financial Year 2024-25. The court directed the petitioner to treat the S. 73 order as notice to S. 74A. Justice Krishnan Ramasamy said that “the provisions of Sections 73 & 74 of the GST Act stood omitted with effect from 01.04.2024 and only the provisions of Section 74A of the GST Act will apply from the financial years 2024-2025 onwards.”

The court accepted submissions of the petitioner, observing that Section 73 and Section 74 ceased from FY 2024-25, the bench said that the department wrongly invoked the provision.The high court observed that the department issued the order without jurisdiction. However, it directed the petitioner to treat the order as notice to Section 74A and asked to file a reply within 4 weeks. The petition was disposed of accordingly

The bench noted the circular mentioned above and said that, since assets held as investments and as freehold land have been clearly and definitively differentiated, the same methodology that is accepted with regard to shares would also apply to the current issue.The court viewed that revenue accepted the accounting methodology and related facts. Therefore there is no error in the decision of the tribunal. Accordingly, the tax appeal was dismissed.

The court held that the Assessing Officer failed to apply his mind and did not properly consider the company’s request. The rejection order was found to be invalid. The court set aside the order rejecting the immunity application and directed the Assessing Officer to reconsider the matter after giving the company an opportunity to be heard. The writ petition was disposed of.

The bench noted that after reading the order, it is clear that the GST officer has considered the reply filed before passing the order. Therefore there is no merit in challenging the same.Additionally, the bench directed the petitioner to approach the appellate authority subject to the Petitioner depositing 25% of the disputed tax in cash from the Petitioner's Electronic Cash Register. Also, it was directed to lift the bank account attachment after receival of the deposit. The petition was disposed of accordingly.

In a recent ruling, the Madras high court has held that income tax reassessment proceedings initiated against a company after the liquidation of the company is invalid. As per the writ petition filed by C. Sivanandam, who is the director of M/s. Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd., the reassessment proceedings were initiated by the income tax department after the NCLT’s order to proceed with liquidation.

Justice C. Saravanan observed that “Since the said Company was ordered to be liquidated by NCLT on 17.10.2022 of the stand of the Department in the impugned order dated 23.04.2023 passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act cannot be countenanced.”Accordingly, the Madras High Court allowed the writ petition. The bench quashed reassessment proceedings.

Justice C. Saravanan observed that the statutory benefit available to a trust registered under Section 12A cannot be denied for a mere technical breach. Therefore the delay in filing Form 10 ought to have been condoned. The Court held that the reasoning given in the impugned order was unsustainable. Thus, it set aside the rejection order. While allowing the petition, the High Court directed that the petitioner comply with the requirements of Section 11. It also instructed the Assessing Officer shall pass a speaking order condonation delay in filing Form 10.

The court observed that since an appeal could be filed against the impugned refund rejection order, it would be appropriate for the petitioner to pursue that remedy.The court pointed out that it had not gone into the merits of the refund dispute. It also explained that the time spent by Vodafone Idea in prosecuting the writ petition would be excluded while computing the period of limitation for filing the statutory appeal. The writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to Vodafone Idea Limited to file an appeal in accordance with law. The court made it clear that all issues were left open to be examined by the appellate authority.

The Bench of Justice C. Saravanan observed that while the department had already concluded the auction and received the demand draft, this should not prevent the petitioner from challenging the same through a civil suit due to the administrative delay in numbering the suit.Accordingly, the Madras High Court directed the Tax Recovery Officer to proceed with the confirmation of the sale and the issuance of the sale certificate in favor of the highest bidder. However, the Court directed that the civil suit be numbered expeditiously with the highest bidder being arrayed as a party in the suit as well.

The Division Bench comprising Justice Jagmohan Bansal and Justice Amarinder Singh Grewal observed that the substantive issue regarding the entitlement of large exporters to deduction under Section 80HHC(3) was already resolved by the Supreme Court. In terms of whether the BRC was submitted, the Bench noted that there are all possibilities of the BRC being submitted by the appellant with the DGFT and Customs.It was accordingly held that the appellant cannot be denied benefit of deduction on the ground that it has not submitted consolidated BRC.In disposal, the Court directed the AO to re-examine its record for the consignment-wise BRC; if the certificates had not yet been furnished, the assessee could submit them before the appellate authority which would be verified and the deduction granted accordingly.

The court pointed out that prolonged incarceration cannot be justified solely based on alleged tax evasion figures when the computation was based on assumptions and the evidence was largely documentary. The court also explained that there was no material on record to show misuse of bail. The court held that the bail order did not suffer from illegality, perversity, or arbitrariness and dismissed the petition filed by the CGSTDepartment.

The Madras High Court remitted an income tax reassessment case back to the Assessing Officer (AO) after noting that the legal heirs of the deceased assessee failed to respond to the show cause notices issued to them. However,the Court directed that the matter would be reconsidered only if the petitioner deposits 20% of the disputed tax demand excluding interest.

Accordingly, the court quashed the reassessment order and remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer. The court made a condition that the petitioner has to deposit 20% of the disputed tax excluding interest under Sections 234A, 234B and 234C within 60 days. That amounts to 20% of ₹1,33,05,275 (tax after interest excluded). Additionally, it was instructed to consider the contested assessment order as an addendum to both show cause notices and to submit a thorough response to them along with supporting documentation.

Thus, the writ petition and the Customs, DRI, and DGFT were directed to give effect to the waiver under paragraphs 8.6 and 8.7 of the scheme. Also, the CESTAT’s pre-deposit order dated 09 August 2000 was quashed as superfluous, since the underlying demand itself was waived. The Court concluded that once the demand was extinguished under the rehabilitation scheme, continuation of the appeal before CESTAT was unnecessary. Both writ petitions were allowed, with connected miscellaneous petitions closed.

Accordingly, the Delhi High Court found no requirement to interfere with the earlier ruling of the Special Judge where the application was noted to be premature, emphasizing that an investigation is the exclusive domain of the agency. However, the High Court maintained that the Investigating Officer should allow the petitioner sufficient time to examine voluminous or old records when being confronted with them to be able to give complete and informed answers towards the investigation.

The State submitted that there is no mechanism to directly transfer the tax paid under CGST and SGST into the IGST head. However, the department concurred with the submission of the petitioner before the Court that the petitioner had indeed paid tax, though under the wrong head. The division bench of Shekhar B. Saraf and Manjive Shukla quashed the impugned order and directed the authorities to reconsider the matter afresh, and to grant refund under Section 77 of the GST Act if any excess tax is found payable to the assessee.The petition was disposed of.

The court after noting the appellate order observed that “The appellate order has not even reached a conclusion that the notification as spoken of in the said order was at all sent to the petitioner either through SMS or through e-mail. The order only speaks of a possibility.” Justice Om Narayan Rai noted that no personal hearing was passed before passing an adversary order. The order of one and half pages does not provide any reason for the conclusion that the proper officer has ultimately reached, said the court. Accordingly, the Court set aside the appellate order and directed fresh consideration of the matter after granting a proper opportunity of hearing.

The Division Bench of Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela observed that Clause 4.4(ii) cannot be read in isolation and must be read together with Annexure V. The court explained that while the RFP refers to evaluation through a CA certificate, the certificate must be in the manner prescribed in the annexure.The court pointed out that Note 2 of Annexure V is mandatory and goes to the root of eligibility. The court clearly stated “The irresistible conclusion is that Note 2 would be mandatory and binding on all the bidders who seek eligibility under Private/Institutional sales.” The court held that invoices, GST returns, and bank statements cannot replace documents specifically required under the tender conditions. It upheld the rejection of the bid and dismissed the writ petition.

Further, observing that the High Court had previously entertained writ petitions raising similar jurisdictional challenges against Bureau of Investigation officers and had granted interim protection, the Court directed that the GST authorities shall not take any coercive steps on the basis of the impugned Section 74 adjudication order till the returnable date. The court, noting that the State strongly contended that the Bureau of Investigation officer had jurisdiction to adjudicate, directed the state to file a report by way of affidavit explaining their stand. The matter has been listed for further consideration on 28.01.2026.

he Division Bench comprising Justice V.Kameswar Rao and Justice Vinod Kumar observed that the words “within a Contracting State” in the tax treaty clearly mean that services must be performed physically in India.The court explained that the treaty does not allow the concept of a virtual service permanent establishment and that courts cannot add new concepts that are not written into the treaty. The court set aside the withholding tax order and sent the matter back to the assessing officer for fresh consideration in line with the law laid down by the court. The petition was disposed of.

The bench had directed the petitioner to deposit a certain amount in addition to the amount already paid under Section 107(6). Accordingly, Justice Piyush Agarwal disposed of the writ petition directing the petitioner to file an appeal before GSTAT up to 30 June 2026. The court clarified that if the appeal is filed within this period, it shall be entertained without raising limitation objections. Additionally, the bench directed that the interim amount deposited, if any made during the writ as per the directions of High Court’s shall be treated as compliance with the pre-deposit requirement under Section 112(8). However, it shall be subject to the petitioner furnishing a certified copy of the interim order along with proof of deposit. The Court also directed the GSTAT Registry to intimate defects, if any, within three weeks of filing, and allowed the petitioner 30 days to cure such defects. Accordingly, the petition was disposed of.

The Court noted that the accused persons themselves had contributed to delays by filing multiple applications. It reiterated that delay alone is not a ground for bail when serious allegations exist. On parity, the Court distinguished the applicant’s case, observing that the co-accused granted bail by the Supreme Court had already spent nearly two years in custody, whereas Koshale was arrested only in September 2025. The Court concluded that parity did not apply and that the applicant’s involvement was sufficiently established to deny bail. As a result, the bail application under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 was rejected. The Court clarified that its observations would not affect the trial, which must proceed independently on the basis of evidence.

The court also observed that prior approval under Section 142(2A) is a jurisdictional requirement; if such approval is invalid, any order based on it is without lawful authority. The court declined to follow the Gujarat High Court's view and followed binding precedents of the Bombay High Court and other High Courts. In view of these findings, the court quashed and set aside the special audit order dated 10 February 2025 and the consequential special audit report dated 6 June 2025. The court clarified that the department was at liberty to proceed afresh in accordance with law, subject to limitation. The writ petition was allowed.

It was observed that while the High Court may correct an error of law apparent on the face of record, it cannot correct the errors of facts, however grave. It cannot also review the adequacy or sufficiency of the evidence led on a point as these are matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative authority. The Bench noted that Raheja’s writ petition had challenged the second show cause notice primarily on jurisdictional grounds, arguing res judicata due to closure of the first show cause notice. His factual defences were not part of the original pleadings and could not be entertained for the first time in appeal. The Court found that IBBI’s order was passed after examining all relevant aspects, and the Single Judge’s dismissal of the writ petition was justified. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the two‑year suspension of Raheja’s registration as Insolvency Professional stands.

The Court observed that such a long delay would defeat the fairness of the process and could make any later levy of duty or penalty arbitrary.In accordance with this, the Court directed the Deputy Commissioner of Customs to pass final assessment orders within six weeks. It was ruled to consider all contentions raised by the petitioner, including the issue of delay. Importantly, the Court restrained the Customs Department from encashing any remaining bank guarantees until the assessment outcome is determined. It further clarified that the authorities cannot demand fresh documentation from the petitioner, and must rely only on the records already submitted at the time of provisional release.

Accordingly, the Court set aside the appellate order only to the extent it enhanced turnover of taxable supply and imposed additional tax at 18% on the alleged excess zero-rated supply. The matter was remanded to the appellate authority for reconsideration on this limited issue.

The court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Shabina Abraham v. Collector of Central Excise (2015), which explained that proceedings cannot continue against a dead person unless the law expressly allows it. The court held that the order passed against the deceased was invalid and unsustainable in law. The recovery notices issued in 2025 were also quashed. The writ petition was allowed in favour of the petitioner.

It was clarified by the court that the requirement of “reason to believe” under Section 110(1) is satisfied if the officer forms a prima facie satisfaction based on material available at the time, and that the law does not require the seizure memo to contain a detailed analysis of such reasons. “Mere absence of detailed reasons in the seizure memo does not invalidate the action if prima facie grounds exist on record” said the bench.The court said that “The appeal is dismissed because "reasons to believe" under Section 110(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 requires only the officer's prima facie satisfaction based on material available at the time of seizure, without necessitating a detailed analysis or dissection of those reasons by the court.”Therefore, the division concurred with the decision of the single bench. It said that the single bench rightly took the decision not to interfere with the order.The appeal was dismissed accordingly.

None appeared for Hearing Despite Multiple Notices: Chhattisgarh HC Refuses to Quash ₹1.37 Cr Personal Penalty under GST Rohan Tanna vs Union OfIndia Through Its Secretary CITATION : 2026 TAXSCAN (HC) 199

In a recent decision, the Chhattisgarh High Court has refused to interfere with a personal penalty of ₹1.37 crore imposed under the GST ( Goods and Services Tax ) Act, 2017. The court noted that the petitioner did not appear for a personal hearing despite multiple notices.

Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi observed the petitioner had knowledge of the proceedings. The petitioner himself produced the Section 74 notice. It also noted that the petitioner was given multiple opportunities. The Court additionally noted that although the impugned order was passed on February 5, 2025, the petitioner came before the High Court about 11 months later rather than using the appeal.Therefore, the single bench refused to exercise writ power. The petition was dismissed and directed to approach the appellate authority for relief.